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China’s current relationship with the RECs 
Africa’s co-operation with the international community, including 
China, has historically taken place either at the continental or 
national level. The 1980 Lagos Plan of Action for the 
Development of Africa introduced the concept of the RECs for 
the first time. The RECs have played a pivotal role in the 
integration efforts of African governments, with regards to 
policy-formulation, trade agreements, as well as regional 
security development. While the Beijing Action Plan of 2012 
seeks to “strengthen practical co-operation” with Africa’s sub-
regional organizations, the co-operation remains limited, as 
exemplified below. 
This policy brief focuses on three RECs, including: The East 
African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). Their relations with China 
have thus far included: the EAC and China having signed a 
Framework Agreement on economy, trade, investment in 2011; 
ECOWAS and China establishing the China-ECOWAS trade 
forum in 2012; and while China’s relationship with SADC has not 
been formalised, there are existing working relations, as 
illustrated by the recent SADC China Infrastructure Investment 
Seminar in Beijing. These trade arrangements mark major 
milestones in not only transforming multi-lateral co-operation, 
but also fostering the integration process of the RECs. 
Challenges of bi-lateral co-operation 
China, as a global force, has influenced bi-lateral trade relations 
in Africa. Padraig Carmody and Ian Taylor (2010) have 
suggested that Chinese actors “adapt their strategies 
geographically” to suit the local context. This form of 
“flexigemony” (flexibility and hegemony) has created major 
challenges for African governments to match China’s financial 
and political strength. The so-called “Angola-Model of Trade”, 
for instance, which provides financial loans for infrastructure 
projects secured with natural resources, has been a common 
strategy used by Chinese actors to gain access to lucrative 
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Recently, China has increased its economic, political and military co-operation with the African 
Union (AU). The diversity of members within the AU makes the continental approach more 
complicated for both Chinese and African actors. This is largely due to the AU’s lack of 
instrumental capacity, resulting from its financial and structural weakness, as an inter-
governmental actor. This policy brief highlights an alternative platform through which co-
operation could be fostered. African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) increase the 
bargaining power of African states, without losing the instrumental capacity of implementing 
and monitoring policies effectively. China’s engagement with the RECs would not only nurture 
regional integration, but also enhance China’s co-operation with Africa as a whole. In the 
following briefing, we argue that increased co-operation with regional organisations is 
necessary as China’s bilateral and continental engagements face institutional, political and 
economic challenges. The RECs need to move to the forefront of the Sino-African dialogue in 
order to satisfy Africa’s aspiration for global markets and China’s interest in increased political, 
economic and cultural co-operation.  
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markets across the continent. This strategy does not only 
highlight the need for effective African negotiators, but also 
supports the commonly acknowledged proposition that “weaker 
states have less bargaining power and are largely ‘acted upon’ 
by bigger parties”. 
A study conducted by the United Nations (UN, 2010) illustrates 
that Africa’s wealth is concentrated, leaving non-resource-based 
economies exposed to an unbalanced trade relationship with 
China. According to this study, “only five countries account for 
more than 90 per cent of all energy exports, only 12 countries 
account for more than 90 per cent of all mineral exports” and, 
“22 countries account for 90 per cent of [agricultural] exports”. 
This underlines a high concentration of wealth in a small number 
of states, which provides an incentive for actors, private or 
public, to take advantage of African states with unstable legal 
systems, as well as fragile environmental and labour laws. Thus, 
the lack of an effective regulatory framework to protect resource 
endowments creates the need for alternative governance 
mechanisms. 
The lack of resource endowments in some countries is a reason 
to increase co-operation with other richer African countries, in 
order to increase collective bargaining power. The Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) is one example of an African country 
that has effectively used its resources as a negotiating tool. The 
DRC was able to gain “aid-assisted Chinese investments […] and 
to ensure minimum local content, with local co-ownership in 
mineral exploitation”. In addition to this, the government of the 
DRC strategically instrumented the renegotiation of 60 35-year 
mining contracts with established western firms. Thus, the 
bargaining power of resource-rich countries like the DRC and 
Angola illustrates the potential that African countries have to 
increase their negotiating power through co-operation.  
The remainder of this policy brief argues that such collective 
strategies are more effective on the regional level, compared to 
a continental approach. 
China and the African Union 
In recent years, China has increased its relationship with the AU, 
both politically and economically. China’s symbolic construction 
of the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa between 2009-2012 
illustrates the growing ties between China and the continental 
organization. Sun (2014) argues that China sees the AU as a 
“stabilizing force in Africa to protect Chinese security interests”. 
China donated US$ 10 million in AU military grants between 
2010 and 2011, which illustrates the importance of security-
related Sino-African engagements. This suggests that China’s 
continental approach focuses on security and diplomacy; while 
its bi-lateral relations are essentially of economic nature. Sun 
also argues, that Africa, seen continentally, falls into China’s 
global foreign policy, as it gathers African support for multi-
national forums, such as the UN. 
The diversity of the members illustrated by varying economic 
levels, institutional structures, special interests and resource 
endowments, makes co-ordination and policy alignment virtually 
impossible. The AU, as an inter-governmental body, has no 
legislative authority and thus operates through non-legislative 
policy-making. Despite the AU’s gradual move from “norm-
setting to implementation”, the low staffing levels of the 
Commission coupled with the non-binding nature of the targets 
renders the AU rather ineffective. Whether China’s reasons for 
increased engagement with the AU are geo-political or security-
oriented, the partnership is weakened by the AU’s lack of 
instrumental capabilities as a continental actor. 
In contrast, the increased homogeneity among neighbouring 
countries makes implementation of policies easier to facilitate at 
the sub-continental level. The RECs, operating under the 
framework of the AU, “have taken effective action to promote 
peace and security”. The AU, in such cases, acts as a facilitator 
and a monitor, by delegating its tasks to subsidiary platforms, 
such the intervention in Mali in 2012, which was led by ECOWAS 
and “endorsed” by the AU. The existence of regional hegemons, 
such as Nigeria within ECOWAS and South Africa in SADC 
reinforces the element of cultural diversity that makes 
implementation at a sub-continental level easier to facilitate. 
Vickers (2013) argues that “the continent’s diversity of interests 
and capabilities” make sub-regional strategies, […] more 
practical”. This does not only apply to military operations, but 
also to economic policies, such as the alignment of tariffs and 
trade agreements.  
The AU is an important actor, as a trans-governmental, 
continental body that reintroduces the Pan-African spirit of 
integration and co-operation. However, the implementation of 
policies that foster these ideals can only occur if the regional 
communities play a more active role in Sino-African relations. 
China’s interests in one country’s resources need to translate 
into spill over effects that benefit the neighbouring countries and 
spur integration.  
Fostering Sino-African co-operation through the RECs 
Given the aforementioned challenges of the bi-lateral and 
continental approaches, this section will underline some of the 
key roles that RECs can play in shaping future Sino-African 
relations, in both public and private sectors. The following three 
examples illustrate some regional projects between the three 
RECs and China. They highlight the ways in which a greater 
unity within African sub-regions could provide more political 
leverage in an attempt to better promote investments and foster 
economic development.  
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 The EAC has been a solid trading bloc through its engagements 
with various actors. The United States (US) has experienced the 
benefits of the EAC, as “working with the entire region reduces 
transaction costs,” while at the same time fostering regional 
integration. The trade volume between the US and the EAC was 
US$ 2.8 billion in 2014, with exports from the EAC to the US 
increasing by 93 per cent between 2009 and 2014. The US has 
also vouched to support “regional integration policies” through 
its new five-year US$ 64 million Trade and Investment Hub in 
East Africa. China has adopted a similar mechanism and signed 
a Framework Agreement on economy, trade, investment to 
cultivate a more “robust partnership”, through regional 
integration. Interestingly, the members of the EAC have 
relatively strong energy endowments, as the Chairman of the 
EAC notes. Kenya has the potential to produce 2000 MW in 
geothermal power; Rwanda can harness Lake Kivu to produce 
700 MW, while Uganda and Tanzania can exploit Hydropower. 
Common industries, such as the energy sector in this case, 
enable increased co-operation among the members of the same 
regional bloc. Compared to a bi-lateral approach, this regional 
trading bloc has the potential to level the playing field with 
China, with less co-ordination problems than those faced by the 
AU. 
The ECOWAS has been a cornerstone in the development of its 
15 member states and a front-runner in regional integration, as 
exemplified by the monetary union between 8 of its members 
since 1994. The China-ECOWAS trade forum enhances this 
integration by creating a “conducive framework for private 
sector institutions and entrepreneurs”. While the empirical 
implications of this agreement are yet to be determined, 
Ghana’s growing economy and Nigeria’s booming service sector 
provide a positive outlook. ECOWAS has stated that its relations 
with China are focused mainly on the following sectors: mining, 
agriculture, infrastructure and pharmaceuticals. The trade forum 
has a focus on the private sector, bringing businessmen 
together, fostering joint ventures and focusing “on maximizing 
Foreign Direct Investment.” ECOWAS has also been in charge of 
peacekeeping missions in the region, such as Sierra Leone, Cote 
D’Ivoire and most recently Mali, which illustrates that China’s 
need for political stability and security should be implemented 
regionally. 
Lastly, the SADC has been “harmonizing national infrastructure 
investment plans within a regional framework.” SADC’s 
relationship with China has developed into a practical co-
operation, fulfilling the agendas set out by the AU. The SADC 
China Infrastructure Investment Seminar in Beijing in July 2015, 
led to the adoption of a Regional Infrastructure Master Plan until 
2027. This plan will guide the implementation of cross-border 
infrastructure projects in three five-year intervals with increasing 
investments of US$ 64 billion, US$ 428 billion and US$ 558 
billion in each period. In comparison to the China and SADC 
trade volume of 2010, which was equivalent to US$ 61.5 billion, 
this strategic investment plan is a major commitment in key 
areas of energy, transport, ICT, water and tourism. The 
existence of such a regional agreement creates an opportunity 
for countries like Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi to benefit from 
SADC’s engagement with China, highlighting the benefits of a 
regional approach to multi-lateral co-operation.  
Recommendations  
Given the aforementioned issues, the following 
recommendations should be considered by both African and 
Chinese actors in order to harmonize trade policies:  
 The AU needs to reorganise its functions and rationalise 
the issue of subsidiarity: (1) The AU develops substantive 
policy targets for its member states, but provides (2) the 
RECs with discretion to take the appropriate procedural 
measures to meet the objectives. This requires increased 
autonomy for the RECs and a binding legal mechanism 
for member states to implement the specified policies.  
 The RECs need to receive increased financial backing 
from the AU, the African Development Bank and member 
states to be able to co-ordinate regional policy 
implementation.  
 Given Africa’s cultural, political and economic diversity, 
the AU should limit itself to target setting and monitoring, 
as well as sharing of best practices. 
 China could invest its expertise in regional 
organizations to develop a more decentralised system of 
governance that bridges the bilateral and continental 
approaches.  
Assessing China’s Role in Foreign Direct  
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Box 1: Regional Economic Communities (RECs) 
The AU recognises eight RECs, the: 
• Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) 
• Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) 
• Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN–SAD) 
• East African Community (EAC) 
• Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 
• Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
• Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)2 
• Southern African Development Community (SADC).  
Source: Africa Union, 2015 
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 The AU, the RECs and China need to develop a 
framework that provides sectorial monitoring to the 
varying levels of governance. For example, while the AU 
maintains authority over security-related matters, the 
RECs are in charge of trade agreements. It is this kind of 
rationalization process that is absolutely imperative, as 
three levels of governance, without clear procedural 
norms, creates problems of accountability.  
 Military interventions, mediation and peacekeeping 
missions should still remain in the hands of the AU that 
may, however, delegate the regional communities to 
take action.  
 China needs to maintain its close ties to the AU, 
especially with regards to security-related matters.  
 The RECs also overlap in membership, which creates an 
increasing web of complexity. Thus, a clear structured 
separation and formulation of the regions is necessary.  
 The RECs need to identify their comparative advantage 
in terms of industry (energy, textile, mining, 
manufacturing, service), develop a continental supply 
chain, harmonise their trade policies in this regard and 
engage China strategically. This would simplify China’s 




Biruk Terrefe  
Sciences Po Paris  
France 
 
Dr David Bénazéraf 
Paris Sorbonne University  
France 
